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Abstract
Purpose – This study aims to identify to what extent the economic factor effect is more salient in shaping
inward foreign direct investment (IFDI) than are institutional factors in G-20 inﬂow patterns.
Design/methodology/approach – Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution
(TOPSIS) method was applied using the World Bank Governance and Development Indicators, followed by a
panel data technique over the period 2005-2015 to estimate the connections between the different dimensions
of economics, institutions and IFDI in the G-20.
Findings – Results showed that countries with better economic performance contrasting with the
governance indicators are more effective at attracting IFDI. However, the correlation between FDI intensity
and governance indicators has been found relatively weak, which may suggest a more controversial role of
institutions as determinants of IFDI.
Research limitations/implications – This quantitative approach uses a country-level set of variables;
therefore, the authors suggest the development of more ﬁrm-level analysis of the impact of institutions. Also,
the limitation of the TOPSIS method itself is based on heuristic assumptions.
Practical implications – The main ﬁndings point to a relatively low impact of institutions on IFDI. The
authors suggest that the global ﬁnancial crisis has changed the rationale of decision-making by multinational
companies.
Originality/value – The originality of the present study was to apply a multi criteria decision-making
technique on FDI’s analysis combined with institutional data.
Keywords TOPSIS, Institutions, Foreign direct investment
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is a category of cross-border investmentwhich aims to establish
a lasting interest in an enterprise,with the direct investor owningat least 10per cent of the voting
power (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2016). It is less volatile than
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portfolio investments and is characterized by a long-term perspective, but a cyclical one, given
theproﬁtability expectations related to thecompany’sperformance (Amal, 2016).
The statistics on FDI track three distinct metrics:
(1) direct investment positions (stocks of investment), which provides information on
the total stock of investment made abroad and received from abroad for a given
reference date;
(2) direct investment income, which provides information on the earnings of direct
investors and of the direct investment enterprises; and
(3) direct investment ﬁnancial transactions, which shows the net inward and outward
investments, with assets and liabilities presented separately by instrument (equity,
debt) for any given reference period (Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development, 2008).
Global FDI ﬂows have been on an upward trend since 2012 and increased by 25 per cent in
2015 to US$1.73tn. This was the highest level recorded since 2007 and the start of the
ﬁnancial crisis, although remaining below the pre-crisis high of US$2.09tn in 2007
(Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2016).
The lack of sufﬁcient regulatory mechanisms and a policy of clear macroeconomic
coordination among the world’s largest economies were the causes of the 2008 crisis, whichwas
peculiar in that it occurred not in developing countries, but in the central developed countries.
This crisis triggered a process of transformation in the mechanisms of global governance: the
loss of legitimacy of the G-8, the broadening of the substantive discussions for the G-20 and the
reinforcement and capitalization of the international monetary fund (Ramos et al., 2012).
In this sense, the G-20 aims to promote an open and constructive discussion between
industrial and emerging countries on key issues related to global economic stability. The
forum was created as a response to the ﬁnancial crises in the 1990s and is made up of the
ﬁnance ministers and central banks of 19 key countries plus the European Union. It
represents 90 per cent of world GDP and 80 per cent of world trade (including intra-EU
trade) and two-thirds of the world’s population, receiving 52 per cent of global FDI
(Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2016).
The main FDI protagonists, multinational enterprises (MNEs), are companies that are
committed to FDI, and to some extent, control value-added activities in more than one
country, internalizing some intermediate products (Dunning and Lundan, 2008).
From the theoretical point of view, the eclectic paradigm (ownership, location and
internalization [OLI]) has been the dominant approach to test the determinants of FDI and
international activities of MNEs (Dunning, 2000).
As a means to understand the FDI determinants, Dunning (1993) proposed four main
motives:
(1) market seeking (ﬁnd new customers);
(2) efﬁciency seeking (lower costs of performing activities);
(3) resource seeking (access resources not readily available at home); and
(4) strategic asset seeking (obtain tangible or intangible assets that might be critical to
the long-term strategy).
On the other hand, Peng et al. (2008) suggest that the strategic choices of MNEs are not only
driven by industry-speciﬁc conditions and the capabilities of the ﬁrm but also reﬂect the
formal and informal restrictions on certain institutional structures confronted by managers,
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i.e. the institutional environment also inﬂuences the company’s strategy, both in national
and international business, independently of a country’s development level.
Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) and Dahlquist et al. (2003) have also demonstrated the
role of the quality of domestic institutions as contributors to cross-country differences in the
way investors hold or do not hold various countries’ assets.
The institutional environment is composed of political institutions (the national structure of
policymaking and the judicial system), economic factors (structure of the domestic market and
the conditions of access to the international factors of production) and socio-cultural factors
(informal rules, customs, traditions, religion and other important aspects). All these elements
encompass the institutional environment of a particular country (Mudambi et al., 2002).
Although the institutional environment has been widely discussed between scholars and
policymakers, there is no consensus over the quality of the national institutional
environment (Kauffmann et al., 2011).
Scott (1987) suggests that a country’s institutional environment is composed of three
pillars: normative, regulative and cognitive. The ﬁrst refers to the patterns of behavior
accepted by the society; the regulative pillar refers to the quality of the laws; and the
cognitive considers values and social and cultural structures. These three pillars allow the
measurement of the quality of the countries’ institutional environments.
Kauffmann et al. (2011) suggest six dimensions involving traditions and institutions,
through which the authority of a given country is exercised. These are Voice and
Accountability (VA), Political Stability and Absence of Violence (PSV), Government
Effectiveness (GE), Regulatory Quality (RQ), Rule of Law (RL) and Control of Corruption
(CC), which encompass theWorld Bank Governance Indicators.
To identify to what extent the economic factor effect is more salient in shaping inward
FDI (IFDI) than institutional factors in the G-20 inﬂow patterns, a decision theory technique
was applied to this study, followed by a panel data analysis. The decision theory has been
developed since the 1930s from different schools and trends of thought to support the
decision-making process. The decision by multi criteria decision-making (MCDM) consists
of a set of techniques to assist in making complex problem decisions, contributing to the
identiﬁcation of priorities (Jannuzzi et al., 2009). The technique applied to this study was
TOPSIS, Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution, developed by
Hwang and Yoon (1981) to determine the solution nearest to the ideal and farthest from the
least-optimal solution.
The TOPSIS method was applied to the World Bank Governance and Development
indicators. A comparison between the FDI ﬂows before and after the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis is
also made to identify FDI patterns.
This study is justiﬁed because the competitiveness of companies and countries has
become increasingly important and depends on investments which consider the political
institutions and economic situation of countries, which can make capital returns more or less
signiﬁcant. This study also aims to collaborate by understanding the “seeking motives”,
contrasted with the role of institutions, through the application of the MCDM decision
technique.
2. The foreign direct investment, multinational enterprise theories and
motives
The problematization of MNE studies started with the publication of Hymer’s (1976)
doctoral thesis on American FDI ﬂows, thus establishing the concept of “transferable
internal advantage” to overcome barriers in the local market. The theory of international
capital movements predicts that capital will move internationally because of the differences
RAUSP
53,3
406
in interest rates among countries, although it could not properly explain FDI itself, where
the investor seeks to control the foreign enterprise.
Hymer (1976) suggested that direct investment is a kind of capital associated with the
international operations of ﬁrms, and that ﬂows of direct investments are determined by the
extent of international operations. Additionally, the amount of capital associated with
international operations depends largely on their extent and imperfections in the capital
market. In other words, the international movement of capital is motivated by the desire to
achieve control and not by differences in the interest rates.
Although Hymer’s thesis is considered as an economic approach; he also pointed out
some behavioral aspects. The nationality of a ﬁrm is of utmost importance, for it affects the
way it behaves and the treatment it receives. The ﬁrm’s, and managers’, legal nationality
may affect the ﬁrm’s behavior.
Vernon (1966) also contributed to the understanding of international capital movements,
considering the type of industry and product cycle. Competitive advantage is addressed here
in terms of less developed countries and their possibility of attracting investments in the
production of standardized products. Three different phases are related here: location of new
products, the maturing product and the standardized product.
The location phase considers that in the early stages of introduction of a new product,
producers are usually confronted with a number of critical and transitory conditions. The
price elasticity of demand for the output of individual ﬁrms is comparatively low, followed
by the high degree of production differentiation or the existence of monopoly in the early
stages. Also, an effective communication between customers and suppliers is higher at this
stage. According to Vernon (1966), considering these aspects there is low probability of a
company moving its activities to a foreign country. While this author provided a general
approach of theMNE’s emergence based on the product cycle life, Aharoni (1966) considered
the company as a part of other systems, such as industry, community and cultural
environment, and argued that there must be a symbiosis between these elements. Because of
lack of market knowledge, companies show little interest in foreign investment, particularly
in relation to less-developed countries. However, as long as the organization gains
experience with its external operations, the company will increase its expansion abroad.
While all these approaches have attempted to highlight the determinants of FDI, several
scholars have provided a more general framework for how companies can make the decision
to internationalize through FDI. The internalization theory, also known as the MNE theory,
suggests that some transactions should occur within the company to improve performance,
considering market imperfections. When markets are “internalized” across borders, the
MNE emerges (Buckley and Casson, 1999).
The internalization beneﬁts arise from ﬁve different market imperfections:
(1) when resource coordination requires a long period;
(2) when the market demands different pricing policies;
(3) when the market removes the monopoly, weakening the contract between the
parties;
(4) when there are inequities between buyer and seller on evaluation of a product that
involves the incorporation of intangible components; and
(5) when internalization is a means of avoiding government intervention.
Although this approach has been considered a dominant paradigm for explaining the
activities of MNEs, there are some critiques of this theory, as pointed out by Dunning (2000):
it does not consider other reasons that could lead a company to generate additional value
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that are not directly related to the cost factor, it does not suggest the ideal way for a
company to organize its foreign operations and it ignores the fact that the opportunities for
new types of alliances lead to internalization without necessarily controlling stock. Based on
the limitations of the internalization theory, and in an attempt to establish a more integrated
approach to explain the determinants of FDI and the activities of MNEs, the Eclectic
Paradigm (Dunning, 1979) – OLI – proposed a broader explanation for the international
movements of companies, which should be based on various aspects of economic theory and
not only in FDI.
Rather than a paradigm, it encompasses various explanations of the activities of
enterprises engaging in cross-border value-adding activities (Dunning, 2000). In its original
form, the eclectic paradigm states that the extension, ﬁgure and pattern of international
production are determined by the conﬁguration of three sets of advantages:
(1) those resulting from the exclusive possession of or access to certain assets
(ownership);
(2) those arising from production (internalization); and
(3) those that are the result of geographical diversiﬁcation or multinationality
(location).
Later on, Dunning (1988) indicated possible extensions to the eclectic paradigm under a
systemic approach, consistent with the dynamics and development of international
production. The four main motives are, as noted by Dunning (1993):
(1) market seeking (import substituting);
(2) resource seeking (supply oriented);
(3) efﬁciency seeking (rationalized investment); and
(4) strategic asset seeking (long-term strategic objectives).
However, in addition to traditional economic approaches, some scholars of international
business (Mudambi et al., 2002; Bevan and Estrin, 2004; and Peng et al., 2009) have studied
the inﬂuence of the institutional environment in companies’ strategies, in both national and
international scope.
While the industry-based view (Porter, 1980, 1989) states that the degree of
competitiveness of an industry determines organizational performance and (Rumelt
et al., 1991; Prahalad and Bettis, 1986, and Barney, 1991) suggests that speciﬁc
capabilities determine superior organizational performance, the institutional view
argues that institutional forces also inﬂuence the organization’s results. The business
environment inﬂuences the company’s strategy, in both national and international
business, regardless of a country’s level of development (Peng et al., 2008). The
institutional view considers institutions as independent variables in strategic vision, by
focusing on the dynamic interaction between institutions and organizations, as both
executives and companies rationally pursue their interests and make strategic choices
within the formal and informal restrictions on a given institutional segment (Peng et al.,
2009).
While the traditional approaches of international business have focused on one aspect or
another of the FDI determinants, changes in the global economy have challenged scholars to
seek mechanisms to integrate the different approaches and establish new motives for FDI.
Thus, to the extent that the world economy is becoming increasingly interdependent, the
search for strategic assets tends to increase, which will lead to a convergence among
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countries as companies advance their own advantages through mergers and acquisitions or
strategic alliances (Dunning and Narula, 1996).
Over the past three decades, numerous MNEs have developed new attitudes and
strategies toward their international activities. Expansion in one sector is constantly
followed by a contraction in another, and new organizational forms are constantly being
revisited to advance the environmental, social and technological sectors. Increasingly, the
MNE tends to control a value chain that ﬁts the exogenous factors and their own strategies
(Dunning and Lundan, 2008).
Van Tulder (2015) proposes three clusters of internationalization motives that can be
linked to Peng et al.’s (2009) strategy tripod: resource-based view with intrinsic motives,
industry-based view with mixed motives and institution-based view with extrinsic motives.
The intrinsic motives are related to the international management itself and the “four main
motives”. The mixed motives involve competitiveness and positioning in the sector, and the
extrinsic motives are related to the escape motives and international economics.
Considering the foreign expansion of a ﬁrm is driven by the expectations of managers,
Cuervo-Cazurra et al. (2015) separated two types of managerial expectations:
(1) economics-driven exploitation and exploration of resources; and
(2) a psychology-driven search or avoidance of environmental conditions.
So, based on the behavioral economics, Cuervo-Cazurra et al. (2015) proposed another four
motives for expanding abroad:
(1) sell more (exploiting, obtaining better host country conditions);
(2) buy better (exploiting, avoiding poor home conditions);
(3) upgrade (exploring new resources); and
(4) escape (explores and avoids poor home country conditions).
The authors explain that these motives were built on behavioral economics, as it places the
manager as the “main economic actor and decision-maker” (Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2015, p. 29).
Panamond (2015) proposed that the traditional framework of FDI motives should be revised
to include the perspective of emerging markets multinationals, as they are often integrated into
global value chains as suppliers or exporters because of their cost-based advantages. This
reﬂects the weak position of MNEs from emerging markets, in manufacturing of standardized
activities, and at low end of value creation in the global chain.
On the other hand, Giroud and Mirza (2015) argue that the classic FDI motives sufﬁce to
explain the MNEs’ choices, although they still require some adaptation in the face of the
complexity of international business (IB) activities. In this sense, the MNE cannot be located at
the center of theglobalvaluechain, butasanetworkwithpowerdispersed inamulti-polarworld.
So, considering the literature review, we can draw two main hypotheses. The ﬁrst
hypothesis is related to the role of institutions. As institutions provide the general framework of
doing business, and managing uncertainties, countries that have improved the institutional
environment through better governance quality may reduce the transaction costs of the value-
added activities of MNEs (Dahlquist and Robertsson, 2001; Dahlquist et al., 2003; Mudambi
et al., 2002; Peng et al., 2009; Kauffmann et al., 2011). Thus, we suggest that:
H1. Countries that perform better in the Worldwide Governance Indicators are more
effective in attracting IFDI.
On the other hand, because the question of institutions is not limited to emerging economies,
we suggest that countries, no matter their level of development, are more likely to record a
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higher intensity of IFDI when they can substantially increase the quality of their governance
system. The G-20 is not a homogeneous group but represents the largest block of countries
that receive FDI and demonstrates that economic and institutional changes can record
different performances and paths. Therefore, we also suggest the following hypothesis:
H2. FDI intensity in the G-20 is positively related to the Worldwide Governance
Indicators.
3. Methodology
MCDM can be understood as a method combining possible solutions grouped into several
criteria, reﬂecting the particular preferences of the decision-maker. Although it is not possible
to know exactly when research on MCDM began, it was during the 1970s that major
developments took place because of the evolution of mathematical programming (Köksalan
et al., 2013). However, it was the economist Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923) who introduced the
concept of efﬁciency (Pareto optimality), one of the key concepts of economics that was
transferred in a direct way to MCDM. Therefore, the Pareto optimality is a necessary
condition to ensure the rationality of the possible solutions generated (Köksalan et al., 2013).
Based on the Pareto’s efﬁciency assumption, and along with the development of the
MCDM ﬁeld of study, different approaches have emphasized the means of supporting the
decision-making process (Roy and Vanderpooten, 1995), which includes two forms of
decision modeling preference: the functional model (Keeney and Raifa, 1976), which has been
used in the multi-attribute utility theory and the relational model, which is presented in the
form of fuzzy relations.
Additionally, Roy and Vanderpooten (1996) propose a classiﬁcation for the different
methods of multi-criteria analysis:
 a category that groups the methods of synthesis and reduction in a single criterion,
without accepting comparability between the alternatives;
 another category that summarizes the methods, focusing on synthesis which leads
to a sort of classiﬁcation; and
 the last category, grouping methods with local iterative discernment.
However, Pardalos et al. (2013) propose four different categories:
(1) multi-objective mathematical programming;
(2) multi-attribute utility theory;
(3) the classiﬁcation of relationships approaches; and
(4) preference disintegrating approach.
We can therefore assume that the MCDM is the act of making decisions regarding the
presence of multiple and conﬂicting criteria about issues that occur around us. The TOPSIS
method proposed by Hwang and Yoon (1981), and the focus of the present study, is based on
the proposition that the best alternative should be the least distance from the ideal solution,
which is the reference point. In this method, the Euclidean distance is used to deﬁne the least
distance. After the normalization and the allocation of weights, the method proposes two
types of references: positive and negative. The positive reference corresponds to the highest
reference over the alternatives and the negative corresponds to the farthest reference. The
Euclidean distance is then calculated based on these reference points (Brauers and
Zavadskas, 2006).
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The method assumes that each attribute in the decision matrix increases or
monotonically decreases the utility: that is, the more spacious the attribute becomes, the
greater the preference for the best option, reducing the preference for the worst criterion.
Furthermore, all the criteria set in a non-numerical form should be measured using the most
appropriate level. Whereas each criterion cannot be assumed to be of equal importance, a
number of weights should be assigned by the decision-maker. Hwang and Yoon (1981)
propose the following econometric model:
3.1 First step
Construction of a normalized decision matrix. This process transforms the various dimensions
of the attributes into non-dimensional attributes, allowing comparison between them. This can
be achieved by the division of each criteria by the total vector resulting of the criteria:
A ¼
v11 . . . v1n
..
. . .
. ..
.
vm1    vmn
2
6664
3
7775
3.2 Second step
Construction of the decision matrix with weights. Different weights, w = (w1, w2,. . ..wj), are
assigned by the decision-maker and are calculated by multiplying each column of the matrix
associated with the weight.
3.3 Third step
Calculation of optimal solutions A þ positive (beneﬁts) and negative ideal solutions A
(costs), as follows:
Aþ ¼ pþ1 ; pþ2 ; . . . ; pþm
 
e A ¼ p1 ; p2 ; . . . ; pmð Þ;
where:
pþj ¼ MaxiPij; j2 J1; MiniPij; j2 J2
 
pj ¼ Minipij; j2 J1;Maxipij; j2 J2
 
;
Where, J1 and J2 represent the criteria of beneﬁt and cost, respectively.
3.4 Fourth step
The calculation of distances. The separation between each alternative can be measured by
the Euclidean distance (n) between the beneﬁts (þ) and (). The calculation of the Euclidean
distances between the beneﬁts is obtained by:
dþ ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Xn
j¼1
wj pþj  pij
 2
vuut ;
with i = 1, . . . , m; and
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d ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Xn
j¼1
wj pj  pij
 2
vuut ;
with i = 1, . . . , m.
where, the values of w_i are the importance grade of each question. In the present study,
the weighting was assigned with values of w_i = 1.
3.5 Fifth step
Calculation of the relative proximity of the optimal solution, which can be deﬁned as:
j i ¼
di
dþi þ di
3.6 Sixth step
Ranking the order of preference. A number of alternatives can be ordered, according to the
order descendent on C1*. The TOPSIS model of this study was developed from data in an
Excel spreadsheet.
To identify the extent to which institutions play a key role in determining FDI inﬂows of the
G-20 countries, the TOPSIS method was applied using the World Bank Governance and
Development Indicators. Additionally, a panel data technique was used over the period 2005-
2015 to estimate the connections between the different dimensions of economics, institutions
and IFDI in the G-20. The use of TOPSIS has different advantages. First, we can establish
which of the indicators or variables can provide the best option for the understanding of FDI
ﬂows among the G-20 countries. Second, by assuming that all variables cannot be assumed to
be of equal importance, we will be able to determine a number of weights that should be
assigned to each of the variables of our model. On the other hand, the panel data technique adds
to the picture, by crossing time series (2006-2014) and cross-sections (countries of the G-20).
In Table I, we show the variables of our model and themethods applied in this study.
Additionally, for the present study, we collected data for 19 of the G-20 countries
(excluding the European Union as a whole). The countries that compose our sample are
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan,
Table I.
Indicators, variables
and methods
Indicators Variables Method
Worldwide Governance Indicators –WGI VA, PSV, GE, RQ, RL and CC TOPSIS
Worldwide Development Indicators – WDI GDP growth, Merchandise Trade (% of
GDP), R&D Expenditure, High-technology
Exports (% of manufactured exports)
TOPSIS
Worldwide Development Indicators – WDI FDI-net inﬂows, GDP at market prices,
GDP per capita
Descriptive statistics Worldwide Development Indicators –WDI
Dependent variable: FDI Intensive (FDI/GDP)
Independent variables: VA; PSV, GE, RQ, RL
and CC
Panel data
Source:World Bank (2015)
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Mexico, Russia, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Turkey, the USA and the UK.
Together, the G-20 represents 90 per cent of world GDP, attracting 52 per cent of global FDI.
4. Analysis and results
The outward and inward direct investment position of a country is systematically related to its
economic development relative to the rest of the world. The investment development path
suggests that countries tend to go through ﬁve main stages of development. These can be
usefully classiﬁed according to the propensity of those countries to be outward and/or inward
direct investors. It is important to note that this propensity rests on the extent and pattern of
the competitive or ownership-speciﬁc (O) advantages of the indigenous ﬁrms of the countries
concerned, relative to those of ﬁrms in other countries (Dunning andNarula, 1996).
Host country determinants affect FDI motivations, such as large populations, individual
incomes and growth of GDP (market-seeking) and costs of production (resource-seeking), as well
as promotion and facilitating efforts through investment policies (Giroud andMirza, 2015).
We will distinguish between two main periods: before the ﬁnancial crisis, covering the
years from 2006 to 2008 and a period after the crisis, covering the years from 2012 to 2014,
for which we gather full data. This time cut is motivated by looking at the role of the
ﬁnancial crisis in shaping world FDI distribution ﬂows and the changes in the determinants
of the global distribution of FDI.
Table II shows that China is ranked highest among the G-20 countries for FDI net
inﬂows, with US$289bn received in 2014, a slight decrease compared to 2013 when it
received US$290bn. Since 1992, China has attracted more FDI than any other emerging
economy, ranking second only behind the USA as a global destination for such
investment.
Table II.
FDI Inﬂows for the
G-20 (19) countries
Countries
FDI net inflows (BoP, current US$)/Thousand
R 2006-2007-2008 2012 2013 2014
China 153,685,511 241,213,868 290,928,431 289,097,181
The USA 322,362,333 232,001,000 287,162,000 131,829,000
Brazil 38,224,663 76,110,663 80,842,997 96,895,163
Canada 80,798,810 39,296,986 70,753,172 57,168,153
Australia 40,050,405 57,616,867 54,554,049 46,333,457
The UK 222,201,836 46,750,711 35,015,209 45,456,617
India 29,554,379 23,995,685 28,153,031 33,871,408
Indonesia 7,053,712 21,200,779 23,281,742 26,349,226
Mexico 27,337,981 19,491,663 44,885,843 24,154,174
Russia 56,083,7848 50,587,555 69,218,899 22,890,510
Italy 23,183,195 34,812 19,530,575 13,726,783
Turkey 20,694,333 13,282,000 12,457,000 12,765,000
South Korea 9,725,433 9,495,900 12,766,600 9,898,500
Japan 16,217,653 546,963 7,412,011 9,069,845
Germany 56,403,827 54,659,879 59,014,769 8,389,632
Saudi Arabia 27,369,091 12,182,373 8,864,693 8,011,787
France 76,908,621 41,496,628 33,551,369 7,956,554
Argentina 7,245,350 15,323,934 8,916,662 6,055,283
South Africa 5,698,362 4,626,029 8,232,519 5,740,651
Note:We distinguish between two main periods: P1 (2006, 2007, 2008) and P2 (2012, 2013, 2014)
Source:World Bank, 2016
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This inward investment is making a major contribution to the development of China’s
economy, in terms of technology, expertise and external trade (Kobrin et al., 2001).
The predominant motive for companies investing in China has been to gain access to the
domestic market – market seeking or sell more (exploiting, obtaining better host country
conditions) (Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2015). Although based on a low average per capita income
(Table III), this market had the incomparable combination of a large population and rapid
economic growth, thus promising proﬁts in the longer term.
As a general analysis, if we consider the average of net FDI inﬂows in the period P1
(2006, 2007, 2008, and pre-global ﬁnancial crisis) compared to 2014, only four countries
signiﬁcantly recovered the investment ﬂows through a signiﬁcant increase in the rate of
IFDI: Indonesia (267 per cent), Brazil (153 per cent), China (88 per cent) and Australia (15 per
cent). The USA, although it receives the second-highest FDI inﬂows, did not reach the pre-
ﬁnancial crisis average, recording a decrease of approximately 61 per cent, followed by
Canada, the UK, Russia, Italy, Turkey, Japan, Germany, Saudi Arabia and France –
developed countries predominating.
In terms of economic performance of the G-20, we also found differences among the
countries. As Table III shows, if we consider only the seven highest GDPs in the period after
the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008 (P2), China and Brazil – both developing countries – have been
the only locales that recorded a positive increase in FDI inﬂow.
To address the institutional changes in the G-20, we set up a TOPSIS for the institutional
indicators, which we captured by using the governance indicators published by the World
Bank. Governance consists of the traditions and institutions, by which authority in a
country is exercised, including the process by which governments are selected, monitored
and replaced (World Bank, 2016).
Table III.
GDP at market prices
and GDP per capita
(USD) for the G-20
(19) countries
Countries
GDP at Market Prices – USD GDP Per capita – USD
R P1 R P2 R P1 R P2
The USA 14,350,701,667 16,783,403,667 47,633 53,022
China 169,126,321 9,435,685,831 2,732 6,949
Japan 4,520,760,883 5,158,500,306 35,325 40,502
Germany 3,398,255,146 3,717,741,253 41,321 45,795
The UK 2,783,729,336 2,777,220,846 45,386 43,295
France 2,637,196,693 2,773,619,121 41,186 42,068
Brazil 1,400,183,075 2,447,689,266 7,254 11,985
Italy 2,179,830,458 2,116,444,060 37,267 35,163
Russia 1,316,827,565 1,985,244,946 9,219 13,767
India 1,137,304,336 1,914,033,523 963 1,495
Canada 1,437,081,028 1,819,022,141 43,657 51,759
Australia 884,830,619 1,518,701,423 42,224 65,760
South Korea 1,045,565,222 1,312,931,722 21,498 26,141
Mexico 1,036,560,299 1,245,987,792 9,155 10,067
Indonesia 435,671,963 905,628,948 1,873 3,605
Turkey 636,130,907 803,511,707 9,140 10,712
Saudi Arabia 437,553,814 744,041,067 16,737 24,645
Argentina 331,922,008 585,473,982 8,293 13,770
South Africa 285,941,280 371,257,004 5,875 6,989
Note: We distinguish between two main periods: Period P1 (2006, 2007, 2008) and period P2 (2012, 2013,
2014)
Source:World Bank, 2016
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The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) aggregate individual governance
indicators for 215 economies over the period 1996-2014, for six dimensions of
governance: VA, PSV, GE, RQ, RL and CC. For the present study, the period 2012-2014
was considered.
By applying the TOPSIS as proposed by Hwang and Yoon (1981), a ranking considering
the best ideal solution is presented in Table IV.
According to the TOPSIS method on the WGI indicators, Canada and Australia
represent the best governance environment from the G-20 countries, while China,
Indonesia, India, Argentina and Russia represent the highest distance from the ideal
solution, thus not showing an effective governance environment.
The importance of formal institutions on safeguarding and policing intellectual property
rights (IPR) had been largely recognized between scholars, and the importance of IPR
protection is likely to vary strongly between industries particularly the high-technology
sectors (Dunning and Lundan, 2008).
Table V shows the total score for the economic indicators considered for the period P2, after
the global ﬁnancial crisis (2012, 2013 and 2014). China, India and Indonesia present the highest
GDP growth in this period, coincidingwith of 88, 12 and 267 per cent of FDI inﬂows, respectively.
The general ranking shows China, South Korea, Australia, Canada and France as the ﬁve
countries presenting the highest scores based on the given variables. South Korea presented
the highest rate of R&D expenditure and high-technology exports.
Based on the TOPSIS assessments of the data, we could ﬁnd no evidence for H1 and
could establish no connections between changes in the institutional environment in the host
country and the attraction of IFDI. However, we consider that the TOPSIS, despite
providing important insight on the classiﬁcation and ranking of the variables, provides no
Table IV.
Governance
indicators TOPSIS
ranking
Countries
Ranking
VA PSV GE RQ RL CC TSG
Canada 1 1 1 2 2 2 1
Australia 2 2 2 1 1 1 1
Germany 3 4 3 4 4 3 2
The UK 4 7 5 3 3 4 3
Japan 7 3 4 6 7 5 4
The USA 6 5 6 5 5 7 5
France 5 8 7 7 6 6 6
South Korea 9 9 8 8 8 8 7
Italy 8 6 9 9 9 11 8
South Africa 10 11 11 12 11 12 9
Turkey 16 19 10 11 12 9 10
Brazil 11 12 15 14 14 13 11
Saudi Arabia 19 13 14 13 10 10 12
Mexico 14 16 12 10 17 16 13
China 18 15 13 16 15 14 14
Indonesia 15 14 16 15 16 18 15
India 12 18 17 18 13 17 16
Argentina 13 10 19 19 19 15 16
Russian Federation 17 17 18 17 18 19 17
Notes: VA: Voice and Accountability; PSV: Political Stability No Violence; GE: Government Effectiveness;
RQ: Regulatory Quality; RL: Rule of Law; Corruption Control; Total Score Governance
Source: Research Data
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conclusive outcome of how the variables affect IFDI. To overcome this limitation, we ran a
panel data analysis to estimate the effects of the institutional variables on IFDI in the G-20
countries.
4.1 Model estimates
To test H2, we used a panel data technique. This technique, according to Raj and
Baltagi (1992), combines cross-sections with time series and permits evaluation of the
relationship between several variables by following the same individuals (countries)
throughout a period. The advantage of the method is to allow a level of speciﬁcation that
helps by identifying the economic model that may offer tighter control over individual
heterogeneity. Furthermore, cross-sectional time series models are used for cases in which a
number of observations need to be monitored over various periods (Fávero et al., 2009).
Our dependent variable is FDI-Intensity (FDIINT) and is measured by the inﬂows of FDI
related to the GDP of each host country.
Our independent variables are the six variables that compose the world governance
indicators of theWorld Bank (per Kauffmann et al., 2011):
(1) Voice and Accountability (VA);
(2) Political Stability No Violence (PSV);
(3) Government Effectiveness (GE);
(4) Regulatory Quality (RQ);
(5) Rule of Law (RL); and
(6) Corruption Control (CC) and Total Score Governance.
Table V.
Economic
development TOPSIS
ranking
Countries
Ranking
GDP MTO R&D HE TSED
China 1 5 7 2 1
South Korea 7 12 1 1 2
Australia 6 2 5 11 3
Canada 10 4 8 10 4
France 18 6 6 3 5
Japan 16 11 2 6 6
Germany 17 7 3 9 7
The USA 9 19 4 5 8
Indonesia 3 9 10 16 9
India 2 8 15 14 10
Brazil 14 3 12 12 11
The UK 13 18 9 4 12
México 8 13 19 7 13
Russian Federation 12 14 13 8 13
Argentina 15 1 18 13 13
Saudi Arabia 4 15 16 19 14
Turkey 5 17 14 18 14
Italy 19 10 11 15 15
South Africa 11 16 17 17 16
Notes: GDP: GDP growth; MT: Merchandise Trade Openness; R&D: R&D Expenditure; HE: High
Technology exports; TSED: Total Score Economic Development
Source: Research Data
RAUSP
53,3
416
The authors attributed scores between 2.5 and þ2.5, with higher scores indicating higher
levels of governance quality.
Before estimating the model, we tested the model to select the most suitable technique for
the panel data: ﬁxed or random effect. We ﬁrst used the Breusch–Pagan test, which showed
a signiﬁcance lower than 5 per cent (x 2 = 33.31; Sig = 0.000). We also used the Hausman test
(x 2 = 17.02), which recorded a signiﬁcance superior to 0.05 (0.0092). The results of both the
tests suggest the choice of the ﬁxed-effects model as the most effective estimator.
Themodel estimate is shown in Table VI.
According to Table VI, the explanatory power of the model can be observed in the coefﬁcient
of determination (R2), which indicates the proportion of the variance in the dependent variable
that is predictable from the independent variable (R2 between = 0.0791), indicating that the
independent variables can explain 6 7.91 per cent of the performance represented by the FDI
Intensity. Also, the prob> F= 0.038 is< 0.05, indicating that themodel is statistically signiﬁcant
in explaining the effects of institutions on the IFDI distribution among theG-20.
While the independent variables (VA, GE, RL and CC) have been found not statistically
signiﬁcant, the PSV has been found positively correlated with IFDI and is statistically
signiﬁcant at 5 per cent. Regulatory quality is also positively correlated with IFDI, but only
statistically signiﬁcant at 10 per cent.
So, the model indicates an overall lower correlation between FDI Intensity and theWorld
Governance Indicators, leading us to reject hypothesisH2.
Additionally, this result is positively related to Table II, which shows that only four
countries had signiﬁcantly recovered the investment ﬂows since the economic crisis:
Indonesia (267 per cent), Brazil (153 per cent), China (88 per cent), and Australia (15 per cent),
although they did not necessarily score highly on the TOPSIS government indicators
(Indonesia, 15°; Brazil, 11°; China, 14°; with Australia the exception at 2°).
5. Conclusion
FDI is an important element of economic integration, providing the means for long-lasting
links between economies. It represents an important vehicle for local enterprise
Table VI.
Panel data regression
with ﬁxed-effects
model
Variables
Model*
Coefficient t p> (t)
Constant 0.9010389 0.85 0.397
VA 2.610859 1.62 0.107
PSV 1.595484 2.22 0.028 (*)
GE 0.8040263 0.75 0.454
RQ 1.97653 1.76 0.080(***)
RL 2.546543 1.84 0.068
CC 4.4543944 0.48 0.629
Observations 209
Groups 10
Prob> F 0.038
R2 within 0.0708
R2 between 0.0791
R2 overall 0.0226
p> x 2 0.0000
Notes: *Signiﬁcant to 0.05; ***signiﬁcant at 10%
Source: Research Data
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development, encouraging the transfer of technology and know-how between economies
(Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2008).
According to the OECD Benchmark deﬁnition, FDI is a category of cross-border
investment which has the objective of establishing a lasting interest in an enterprise. The
“lasting interest” is evidenced when the direct investor owns at least 10 per cent of the
voting power of the direct investment (Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development, 2008, p. 16).
Additionally, Peng et al. (2008) suggested that the business environment inﬂuences the
company’s strategy, and both executives and companies rationally pursue their interests
and make strategic choices within the formal and informal restrictions on certain
institutional segments (Peng et al., 2009). Institutionalism in the economic tradition stresses
the role of formal and informal institutions in reducing uncertainty and opportunistic
behavior, and lowering transaction costs (North, 1986).
Thus, the objective of this work is to identify to identify the extent to which the economic
factor effect is more salient in shaping IFDI than institutional factors in G-20 inﬂow
patterns, through the application of the TOPSIS method on theWorld Bank Governance and
Development indicators followed by a panel data analysis. A comparison between the FDI
ﬂows before and after the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis was also made to identify FDI patterns.
The study was based on the World Bank Development Indicators, past and current FDI
inﬂows for the G-20 (before and after the global ﬁnancial crisis: P1 & P2), as well as the six
governance dimensions: VA, PSV, GE, RQ, RL and CC.
Results showed that China held the top ranking of FDI net inﬂows for the G-20 countries,
with US$289bn received in 2014. China has attracted more FDI than any other emerging
economy since 1992 as a global destination for such investment, ranking just behind USA.
The predominant motive for companies investing in China has been to gain access to the
domestic market – market seeking or sell more – exploiting, obtaining better host country
conditions (Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2015). Although based on a low average per capita income
(Table III), this market had the incomparable combination of a large population and rapid
economic growth, pointing to high expected proﬁts in the longer term (Boisot and Child,
1996).
Only four countries had considerably recovered investment ﬂows from the period before
the ﬁnancial crisis, recording signiﬁcant increase rates: Indonesia (267 per cent), Brazil (153
per cent), China (88 per cent) and Australia (15 per cent). Among other G-20 countries, the
USA had still not recovered to the pre-ﬁnancial crisis period average, with a decrease of
approximately 61 per cent (although it continues to receive the second-highest FDI inﬂows).
Next were Canada, the UK, Russia, Italy, Turkey, Japan, Germany, Saudi Arabia and
France, with developed countries predominating.
As for theWGI, the TOPSIS ranked Canada andAustralia as having the best governance
environment among G-20 countries, while China, Indonesia, India, Argentina and Russia
situated at the greatest distance from the ideal solution and thus not presenting an effective
governance environment.
Van Hoorn and Maseland (2016) state that institutional research offers little solid insight
on how institutions matter for IB. In this sense, Indonesia, Brazil and China maintained
positive investment ﬂows in contrast with the government indicators ranking of 15, 11 and
14, respectively, which led us to rejectH1.
Additionally, the longitudinal regression showed little correlation with the government
indicators over the dependent variable, FDI Intensity. Only the variable PSV (Political Stability
No Violence) presented signiﬁcance on this model. This result may lead us to the conclusion that
certain host country determinants, such as large populations, individual incomes and growing
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GDP (Giroud and Mirza, 2015), are more important determinants for FDI patterns than are
governance indicators, leading us to assert that institutions have less inﬂuence on FDI decisions.
The institutional perspective has evolved signiﬁcantly in the past three decades,
particularly its applications in the international business ﬁeld. The main objective of the
present study was to investigate the determinants of FDI, and particularly the effect of
institutions on FDI before and after the global ﬁnancial crisis. This implies that the
effectiveness or quality of the institutional framework has a direct bearing on the
performance of countries and organizations. However, it seems that the effects of
institutions can change over the time. Under certain circumstances, they may lose their
power in providing a best prediction of the geographic distribution of FDI among countries.
Our main ﬁndings point to a relatively low impact of institutions on IFDI. We suggest that
the global ﬁnancial crisis has changed the rationale of decision-making by multinational
companies. Where institutional stability is key to a large extent, economic factors may have
performed a higher impact in shaping the patterns of FDI in the period of global ﬁnancial crisis.
This, on the other hand, does not suggest that institutions do not matter. They continue to
provide a powerful predictor of the behavior of ﬁrms when operating globally. However, their
effects may bemoderated by the economic dimensions and performance of the host countries.
For future studies, a qualitative study should be carried out with MNE executives to
obtain a deeper understanding of how the role of institutions can change in the period of
global crisis. It is important to note that the role of institutions reﬂects to some extent the
perception of managers and decision-makers of multinational companies. This process of
seizing the changing role of institutions will depend on how ﬁrms will balance their
strategies in different economic contexts. Therefore, we suggest the development of more
ﬁrm-level analysis of the impact of institutions in a dynamic and changing world.
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